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INTRODUCTION

The immediate consequence of the decision in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez' was to foreclose a federal attack on certain inequitable school financing programs. There were, however, ancillary consequences which may have a direct bearing on other educational reform litigation presently pending in the courts or contemplated by reform advocates.
Some of these secondary effects are occasioned by direct holdings made in
the course of turning back the challenge to the Texas school financing scheme;
others are results of dicta which may well be persuasive in educational reform
litigation in the future. This article explores the impact of Rodriguez on such
litigation.
That exploration commences with an analysis of the relevant sections of the
Rodriguez decision, followed by an examination of pre-Rodriguez developments
in non-school finance educational reform litigation. The article then analyzes
some of the parameters of Rodriguez and suggests alternative concepts which
may limit the decision's consequences. Finally, some of these concepts are
applied to identify the future of specific areas of litigation which were developing before Rodriguez.

THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION

In order to appreciate the significance of the decision in Rodriguez, it
is necessary to understand basic fourteenth amendment equal protection
analysis. The equal protection clause comes into play whenever a governmental
unit treats any discernible group differently from another. In determining
whether this difference constitutes a violation of equal protection, the courts
have developed what amounts to two standards. If either the interest affected
is deemed to be a "fundamental interest" or the group denied equal treatment
is deemed to be "suspect" then the governmental entity bears a heavier than
usual burden in justifying the unequal treatment. It must show that the classification is narrowly tailored and necessary to promote a compelling interest
of the state. That burden is rarely, if ever, sustained. 2 Examples of fundamental
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1411 U.S. 1 (1973).
2 For a discussion of the nature of this burden, see San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17. See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
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interests are voting,3 travel, 4 and the right of procreation. 5 Examples of sus-

pect classifications are those in which racial groups,6 aliens,7 national origin
groups,' and possibly illegitimates9 are denied equal treatment.
If, on the other hand, no fundamental interest is found to be infringed
and if the classification scheme is not found to be suspect, then the classification
is deemed presumptively valid, 10 and the state need show merely that the classification bears some rational relationship to a permissible state objective."
Under this second standard, it is much easier for the state to justify differential
treatment and consequently much more difficult to strike down such treatment
on equal protection grounds.
It is against this background of two standards that one must measure the
impact of Rodriguez on other educational reform litigation, for the greatest
loss apparently suffered by educational reform litigants was the holding that
education is not a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection
analysis. Most educational reform attorneys believed that if education were
deemed to be a fundamental interest, many school classification deviceswhich seem inevitably to work against the interests of the weakest and most
disfavored members of society' 2-could be successfully attacked. Often these
devices can be justified by a rational relationship argument, but rarely can
they withstand the compelling interest test.
Both the specific holdings of Rodriguez on this point and the dissent of
Justice Marshall must be examined to appreciate the scope of the Court's
decision. The Marshall dissent enunciates a principle which may become
equal protection doctrine in the future, notwithstanding its immediate rejection by Justice Powell for the majority.' 3 The majority opinion by Justice
Powell' 4 reached its conclusion after first disclaiming that, "[n]othing this
Court holds today in any way detracts from our historic dedication to public
education."'1 5 This language which reappears several times in the majority
opinion is significant in light of the possibility that the analytic tools enumerated
in the Marshall dissent may find their way into court opinions in the future.
' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 626 (1969).
4Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
5See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
( McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
7 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
8 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
' Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 172-76 (1972).
10 Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
11 See, e.g., Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955).
12For a cogent picture of the development of this phenomenon in one northern city, see
TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL, THE WAY WE Go TO SCHOOL: THE EXCLUSION OF
CHILDREN
IN BOSTON (1971).
1

3See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
14Justice Powell was joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Blackmun; Justice Stewart
concurred in the result, agreeing that education was not a fundamental interest. 411 U.S. at 62.
15
Id.at 30.
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The second step in the majority analysis was to require that a fundamental
interest be one that is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."'1 6
The deathknell of the broadly asserted claim that education was fundamental
was sounded when the Court found that the right to education was neither
explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. This was so even though

the Court acknowledged that education has a strong nexus with such guaranteed
first amendment rights as speech and that it is important to the intelligent
use of the right to vote, a fundamental interest. 17 As will be discussed below,
the Court did, however, leave open the possibility that an absolute deprivation
of education might cut so deeply into the ability to exercise first amendment
rights that a fundamental interest would be infringed.
The other significant holding of Rodriguez was that district property wealth

is not a suspect classification. Plaintiffs living in property-poor districts had
previously argued that because they were not receiving a per pupil expenditure
equal to that received by children in districts of greater property wealth, they
were being discriminated against on the basis of wealth. This discrimination,
they argued, was suspect, and thus the compelling interest test must be applied.
The basic precedents for this position were Griffin v. Illinois"8 and Douglas
v. California.19

If district property wealth is not per se a suspect classification, perhaps such
wealth-when more closely linked to an important interest-will be so considered. The Court's language which supports this conclusion is as follows:

"But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never heretofore held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict
scrutiny, appellees have not relied solely on this contention.12 0 A reasonable
implication to be drawn from this statement is that a wealth classification

which effectively discriminates with respect to an important interest would
call for the application of the compelling interest test. 2' It might
be that
22
education could be deemed to be such an interest at a later time.

If the analysis above is correct, then several other holdings with respect
to the wealth claim may be the causes of its rejection in the Rodriguez decision.
The Court first held that it could not find a discernible class of poor persons
who had been discriminated against. 23 It then held that since there was no
absolute deprivation of education, the claim was totally defective. 2 4 If one takes

these holdings at face value,'25 then-at least as to the wealth aspect of the case16 Id. at 33-34.
17

See discussion, id. at 35-36.

18 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
19

372 U.S. 353 (1963). See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Tate v. Short, 401

U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
20 411 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added).
21 The "wealth alone" language seems to imply a tying relationship with the interest denied.
An examination of the wealth discrimination cases indicates that wealth has been tied to important
interests-but not necessarily "fundamental" ones. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22 See the text at pp. 577-78 infra.
23 411 U.S. at 22.
24
Id. at 23-25.
25 The dissent of Justice Marshall seriously questions the validity of these assertions and
questions the criteria used to distinguish the Rodriguez case from Griffin and Douglas. See id. at 88-91.
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the Court's statement that the case "in significant aspects is sui generis 2 6
probably should give hope to educational reform attorneys; rarely, if ever
again, will one find a class as amorphous as that in Rodriguez. Furthermore,
absolute deprivation in the Douglas and Griffin sense is more typical of the usual
outside the school finance area, than is the relative deprivation
education claim,
27
of Rodriguez.

The dissent by Justice Marshall is significant because it represents the first
explicit adoption by a member of the Court of a position that has been advocated
by some commentators.2 8 Justice Marshall argues persuasively against the equal
protection double standard and in favor of a sliding scale. Basically Justice
Marshall's equal protection analysis would work like this: the more important
the interest involved or the more questionable the basis of classification, the
greater the burden on the defendant to justify its existence. Justice Marshall
notes, as have the commentators, that several recent cases purporting to invalidate governmental action under the rational basis test involved statutes
which could in fact be supported by rational arguments on behalf of the
defendant governmental entity.2 9 He argues that this indicates that the traditional double standard is unworkable and that a sliding scale is preferable.
Thus, even if education is not a "fundamental interest," it may be of such im-

portance that a governmental agency should have to show more than a merely
rational relationship between a state policy and an educational classification.
II
PRE-RODRIGUEZ EDUCATIONAL REFORM LITIGATION

A. Tracking and Testing
The basic harm attacked by the tracking and testing cases is that children
are removed from the educational mainstream and directed into special
30
classes with severely limited objectives on the basis of invalid testing devices.
These special classes may range from those with vocational, rather than academic, objectives to those for the mentally retarded. The common consequence of invalid testing is that racial and linguistic minorities are overrepresented in such classes. 3 1
The leading case in this area is Hobson v. Hansen,32 in which Judge J. Skelly
Wright made several crucial findings with respect to the tracking system in
use in the District of Columbia school system. Judge Wright found that a disproportionate number of black and poor students were placed in the lessacademic tracks, 33 making the classification a suspect racial classification.
26

d. at 18.

27 See the text at pp. 577-78 infra.
2

' See Gunther, supra note 13.
See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
1643 0(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See, e.g., Kagan,The IQ Puzzle: What Are We Measuring?, 14 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 5 (1973).
29

31

Id.at 9-10.
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., sitting as District Court Judge), affd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
33 269 F. Supp. at 456.
32
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Nevertheless, it appears that the court need not have relied on the presence
of a suspect classification, since the same result could have been reached under
the less stringent equal protection standard. The court's examination of the
District of Columbia tracking system convinced it of the system's irrationality.
This conclusion was reached after an examination of the claimed justification
-the giving of compensatory and specialized assistance-showed that children
in the special groups received little, if anything, extra.
There was also evidence that the devices used to place children in lower
tracks were themselves suspect. Substantial evidence was produced showing
that the standardized tests used to measure ability were of questionable worth
when applied to economically deprived black children. The court identified
the defect of the tracking system as follows:
Since by definition the basis of the track system is to classify students according
to their ability to learn, the only explanation defendants can legitimately give
for the pattern of classification found in the District schools is that it does
reflect students' abilities. If the discriminations being made are founded on anything
other than that, then the whole premise of tracking collapses and with it any justification for relegating certain students to curricula designed for those of limited
abilities. While government may classify persons and thereby effect disparities
in treatment, those included within or excluded from the respective classes
should be those for whom the inclusion or exclusion is appropriate; otherwise
the classification risks becoming wholly irrational and thus unconstitutionally
discriminatory. It is in this regard that the track system is fatally defective,
because for many students placement is based
on traits other than those
34
on which the classification purports to be based.
Accordingly, Judge Wright enjoined use of the tracking system as it then
existed in the District of Columbia.35

The other major reported decision in this area is Larry P. v. Riles,36 in which
the plaintiff had challenged the placement of black children in Educationally
Mentally Retarded (EMR) classes on the basis of culturally biased testing mechanisms. The court held that, given the fact that IQ tests were the primary
basis for placement in EMR classes and given the fact that there was a disproportionate number of blacks in these classes, the burden would shift to the

school district to show that "I.Q. tests are rationally related to the purpose of
segregating students according to their ability to learn in regular classes, at
least insofar as those tests are applied to black students. ' 37 The school district
could not meet this burden. Instead, the district argued that there were no

alternative methods of classification which were as good-a contention the
court rejected, noting that both Massachusetts and New York had found alternative methods of placing children into EMR classes. 38
Several other cases challenging EMR placement on the basis of culturally
34

Id.at 513 (emphasis added).
3-It should be noted that it was only the tracking system as it then operated that was stricken
down. Indeed, the court stated that a system which placed children on the basis of accurate measures
of ability (and, implicitly, that provided meaningful and real benefits) might well be constitutional.
Id. at 511. This view was also expressed by the court of appeals in affirming. See 408 F.2d at 189.
36 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
37
Id. at 1314.
38
Id. at 1313-14.
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and/or linguistically biased testing procedures have been settled by consent. 39
Stipulations in these cases implicitly acknowledge that large groups of Spanish
speaking children have been inappropriately placed in EMR classes on the
basis of defective tests. The readiness of the defendants in these cases to settle
can be seen both as a professional recognition of the wrongs that have been
traditiohally perpetuated and as a legal recognition of the vulnerability of
such placement to equal protection attack.
Finally, a related line of cases should be noted. In several decisions 40 courts
have struck down tracking devices seemingly designed to frustrate desegregation orders. Although these cases arise in a different factual and legal context than those previously described, they do have one important common
thread-the inappropriate use of tracks to place minorities in categories with
less opportunity than those offered majority students.
B. Rights of Handicapped Children
Probably the most active area of classification litigation at the present time
is on behalf of handicapped children. 41 Large numbers of handicapped children
have been, and continue to be, excluded from school. 42 This exclusion results both from state mandates 43 and from de facto practices.4 4 It was this
exclusion that originally prompted the filing of suits on behalf of handicapped
children. Success in litigation on behalf of handicapped children who had been
barred from school has prompted recent challenges to more subtle governmental wrongs.
The first legal breakthrough on behalf of handicapped children was in
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania.45 In
Pennsylvania a retarded child could be barred from receiving an education
if he were deemed "uneducable. '4 6 Overwhelming evidence was produced
to show that all children are educable in one fashion or another and that the
47
uneducable concept was an outdated and irrational principle.
Two legal theories were advanced to attack the Pennsylvania statutory
scheme. First, it was alleged that procedural due process was violated in that
no hearing was provided prior to exclusion. It was alleged that both the importance of the interest denied and the stigma which attached to the excluded
child necessitated a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing. Secondly, it was
"IGuadalupe Organization v. Tempe Elementary School Dist., CA 71-435 PHX (D. Ariz.,
Jan. 9, 1972); Diana v. California Bd. of Educ., C 7037 REP (N.D. Cal., June 18, 1971).
'oSee, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Singleton
v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D.
La. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).
41See COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, CONTINUING SUMMARY OF PENDING AND COM-

(A. Abeson ed. 1973).
& D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW AND EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1971).
3
4 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (1962).
44 See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
45343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
46PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (1962).
47See 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
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42See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON
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alleged that equal protection was violated by the exclusion. It was argued that
given the vacuousness of the "uneducable" concept, the statutory exclusion
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny under either the rational relationship or the compelling state interest test.
Although the case was ultimately resolved by a consent decree, the court
found it necessary to find that causes of action had been stated because, without
such a finding, the court had no jurisdiction to approve the decree. The stigma
associated with the classification of mental retardation was sufficient to
establish a colorable claim to the right to a prior hearing.48 Interestingly,
the court found it unnecessary to rule on the claim that education was an
essential interest deserving of due process protection. 49 The court held that

the equal protection claim stated a colorable claim for relief,50 but rejected
an invitation to classify education as a fundamental interest since the plaintiffs'
claim satisfied the less stringent rational basis test."'
Another leading case, Mills v. Board of Education,52 is a stronger precedent
for handicapped children in three respects. First, whereas the PARC court
merely ruled that the plaintiffs had stated a colorable claim, the Mills court
actually ruled on the merits. Second, while the PARC case merely benefited
retarded children, the Mills decision was on behalf of all handicapped children
residing in the District of Columbia. Finally, the Mills court was not faced with
de jure statutory exclusion as was the Pennsylvania court, but rather dealt
with a factual situation in which children either were shoved out of school
through informal devices or were initially denied placement.
Mills, relying on Brown v. Board of Education,53 its District of Columbia
counterpart, Bolling v. Sharpe,5 4 and Hobson v. Hansen,55 held that if denial of

equal educational opportunity was unconstitutional then "[a] fortiori, the
defendants' conduct here, denying plaintiffs and their class not just an equal
publicly supported education but all publicly supported education to other
children, is violative of the Due Process Clause."5 6 Mills also held, on due process
grounds, that a hearing was required prior to placement in a class for handicapped children, spelling out in great detail the elements of such a due process
hearing. In prescribing relief, the court required that education appropriate to
in an inthe needs of handicapped children be provided. Mere placement
57
adequate program would not meet the mandate of either decision.
4' The court relied upon Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971), which held
that the posting by a city of a notice in liquor stores forbidding sales to Mrs. Constantineau because of her "excessive drinking" imposed such a stigma that it had to be preceded by a hearing.
343 F. Supp. at 295.
9343 F. Supp. at 295 n.48.
5
at 295.
5oId.
1
1d. at 283 n.8.
52 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
53347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54347 U.S. 497 (1954).
" 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
56 348 F. Supp. at 875 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the court held the exclusion
improper on statutory as well as constitutional grounds.
"7 The PARC agreement stated that "[i]t is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each
mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity ... "343 F. Supp. at 307. The Mills court ordered that no child should be excluded
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One other handicapped child case, LeBanks v. Spears,5 8 has reached resolution. There the parties have agreed that all retarded children should receive
an appropriate education and have established elaborate procedural safeguards
to insure the propriety of any placement out of a regular classroom. Like
PARC and Mills, the LeBanks agreement assumes that a child should be placed
in a regular classroom if possible and that, if not, the child should be assigned
to a setting which resembles a normal classroom as much as possible.
C. Bilingual Education
In order to understand the legal thrust of the bilingual education suits it
is first necessary to recognize that the bilingual education reform movement
is comprised of two groups with somewhat different philosophical and educational goals. The first advocates full language maintenance and biculturalism
as part of the education curriculum. Although there are various approaches
to this goal, the concept of teaching substantive courses in the native language
of the child is the common thread. The second group has much more modest
goals, seeking merely that meaningful English as a Second Language (ESL)
instruction be given. This is typically a supplementary program in intensive
English, and the child continues to take his substantive courses in English. 59
The argument for bilingual education has two prongs. First, to compel a
child who does not understand English to sit in a class conducted in English
is to treat identically two groups which are manifestly not identical-a totally
irrational classification. Second, if one describes education as the communication
of ideas, then the child who speaks no English is absolutely deprived of an education by being compelled to be educated in a classroom in which he cannot
communicate. The result is constructive exclusion from the classroom.
ESL advocates make the same arguments, adding that refusal to provide
supplementary help when methods are readily available is irrational in light
of the state's objective of educating and socializing children through the school
system. 60 The arguments for both bilingual education and ESL assert that
an ethnic minority is discriminated against by the failure to provide special
assistance, so that the refusal should be measured against the compelling
interest test.
The necessity for such constitutional contentions is questionable given the
Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols,61 which avoided the constitutional
issue by holding that section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 196462 compels a
school district to establish some form of supplemental assistance for children
who have English language deficiencies. 63 The majority opinion clearly left
from a regular class unless "adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs"
were provided. 348 F. Supp. at 878.
58 CA No. 71-2897 (E.D. La., Apr. 24, 1973).
59 For a broad survey of methods and theories of bilingual education, see 1-2 T. ANDERSON
& M. BOYER, BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES (1970).
60 See, e.g.,

574
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to the discretion of school officials whether supplemental assistance should
be in the form of an ESL or a bilingual program. Although the Court avoided
the constitutional issues in Lau, it may not be able to do so forever. Since
section 601 is triggered only when a school district receives some form of
federal assistance, it is not inconceivable that some small systems might find
it more costly to establish a supplementary English program than to lose
federal assistance. If this occurred, then the constitutional arguments would
6 4
of necessity have to be addressed.
Several district courts which have ruled in favor of plaintiffs seeking
bilingual education have grounded their decisions on the constitutional claim.
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools 65 held that providing identical education to
groups which are not identical is a denial of equal protection. The court implicitly abjured the concept that a school merely takes students as it finds them,
holding instead that, "[t]he promulgation and institution of a program by
the Portales school district which ignores the needs of [minority] students
67
66
In Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education,
does constitute state action.
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that a claim for bilingual education
failed to state a cause of action was denied. Finally, it should be noted that
several courts have ordered bilingual education in conjunction with deseg68
regation decrees.
D. Sex-related Discrimination
The most common forms of sex discrimination in public education are
the exclusion of pregnant girls or unmarried mothers from the system entirely,
the refusal to permit participation by married males in extracurricular activities, and the exclusion of girls from traditionally male athletic activities. All
of these discriminatory practices have been under legal attack.
The leading case concerning the exclusion of pregnant girls and unmarried
mothers is Ordway v. Hargraves,69 in which the school principal testified that
he could not state any educational purpose for the exclusion, thus implicitly
admitting that the exclusion was based on an antiquated sense of morality.
Given those facts the court had no difficulty in striking the exclusion on the
grounds that it violated the plaintiffs equal protection rights. The court gratuitously recited the importance of education in the American system in rendering its decision, but it is clear that the case could be sustained under a
limited standard of review; that is, the court could have found no rational re64If this scenario develops, another possible constitutional issue might be raised-whether
a district, in order to continue national origin discrimination, could reject federal financial assistance. The effect of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1969), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.

385 (1969), is interesting to contemplate. See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. One, 303 F. Supp.
279 (D. Colo. 1969).
11 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).

6Id. at 1283.
7 Civil No. 72-4002 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 23, 1973).
68 Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex 1973), United
States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972). In Arvizu
the court failed to find actionable segregation with regard to Chicanos, but ordered bilingual
education nonetheless. "
69 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971).

POTENTIAL IMPACT OFRODRIGUEZ

lation between the practice and legitimate state purposes.
Another decision in this area, Pery v. Grenada Municipal Separate School

District,7 0 upheld the school's right to exclude students who lacked moral
character, while indicating that the bearing of one child out of wedlock does
not necessarily establish a lack of moral character.7 In addition, the court
mandated that a due process hearing7 2 to determine the extent of moral depravity must be held prior to exclusion.7 3 Courts have also found per se rules
to be inappropriate in cases challenging the exclusion of married students
from extracurricular activities.7 4 And, although some courts have indicated
that "moral pollution" might be grounds for exclusion, no court has yet found
a student to be morally polluting.
Regarding female participation in male athletics, the courts generally have
held that it is a denial of equal protection to deny a female the right to compete with boys in non-contact sports, at least where there are no comparable
teams for girls.75 Arguments that there is a rational reason for denial of the
right to compete have generally been rejected where the sport is a non-contact
one. The separate-but-equal issue is still an undecided one.
E. Fees
Possibly the best introduction to the legal concept used to challenge the
imposition of fees is to quote from Shapiro v. Thompson. 76
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity
of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether
for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may
not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of

citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expendituresfor education by barring indigent
childrenfrom its schools.

The legal undergirding of the attack on school fees is that charging a price
for any essential item in the educational process effectively excludes indigent
77

children.

F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
1d. at 753.

70 300

71
2

' 1d.

73

See also Schull v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Miss.
1972); Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929).
74 Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Moran v. School Dist. No. 7,
350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
7' See, e.g., Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1973); Brendan
v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972).
76 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (emphasis added).
7 Because this article is primarily concerned with equal protection analysis after Rodriguez, the
discussion in the text is limited to the analysis of equal protection challenges to the imposition of
fees. It should be noted, however, that several state courts have invalidated fees on various state
constitutional and statutory grounds. It is not unusual for a state constitution to provide for a
"system of public free common schools" or to contain similar language that has been held to be counter to a fee requirement. For state cases invalidating fees on other than equal protection grounds, see
Pacheco v. School Dist. No. 11, - Colo. -, 516 P.2d 629 (1973); Paulson v. Minidoka County
School Dist., 93 Idaho 489, 463 P.2d 935 (1970); Bond v. Public Schools of the Ann Arbor School
Dist., 383 Mich. 693, 178 N.W.2d 484 (1970); Granger v. Cascade County School Dist., 159 Mont.
516, 499 P.2d 780 (1972).
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The leading equal protection case concerning the payment of fees in education is Johnson v. New York State EducationDepartment.78 In Johnson, children
in grades one through six had to pay for their own textbooks unless their
local school district adopted a tax by special election to pay for the textbooks.
Many local districts failed to vote such a tax. The chief ground of attack was
that the classification of pupils in grades one through six on the one hand
and in grades seven through twelve on the other was "arbitrary, irrational,
and discriminatory. '7 9 The trial court refused to convene a three-judge
court on the grounds that the claim was insubstantial and dismissed the complaint.80 In affirming, the court of appeals rejected an argument raised by an
amicus curiae brief that "[w]herever the State undertakes to provide education,
there is a duty to provide free textbooks," 8' holding that education was not a
fundamental interest.82 There was no significant discussion of the goals of
the legislation or of whether the denial of textbooks rationally advanced those
goals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but while the case was pending,
the school district voted to purchase all the textbooks for grades one through
six. Thereafter the 'Supreme Court vacated the judgment by a per curiam
opinion, and the case was remanded to determine whether it had become
moot.83

Another Second Circuit case, McMillan v. Board of Education, 4 offers
some support for an attack on fees. 85 There the plaintiffs argued that a statute
providing a $2,000 maximum tuition grant to certain handicapped children whom
a school district could not accommodate effectively denied an education to
indigent children since most private programs cost more than $2,000. The
trial court denied a motion to convene a three-judge court and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 88 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
a substantial constitutional claim was stated. The basis of the court's decision
was that the grant was available only if a child first enrolled in a school, and
thus, as a practical matter, an indigent child would be excluded from access
to any of the $2,000 since the child could not afford to attend the school even
with the $2,000. The court indicated that it might rule differently if a $2,000
voucher was handed to each child, 7 although in practical effect it is difficult
to justify the distinction.
F. Suspension and Expulsion: Due Process
No listing of educational reform litigation is complete without at least a
78 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 75 (1972) (for a determination
:f mootness).
79 449 F.2d at 873.
80 319 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
81 449 F.2d at 878.
2
1 Id. at 879.
83 409 U.S. at 76.
84 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
85 Additional support can be found in state court decisions striking down school fees on the
basis of state constitutional provisions which require the provision of education by the state. See,
e.g., cases cited note 77 supra.
86 331 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
87 430 F.2d at 1149. The lower court on remand abstained in an unreported order. Cf. Williams
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mention of the widespread attack on statutes, regulations, and practices which
are used to suspend or expel students without a constitutionally adequate
hearing.88 In determining whether a due process hearing is required prior to
the deprivation of a governmental benefit it is necessary only to ascertain
whether there is a "protected interest 8' 9 involved, not whether the deprivation
affects a "fundamental interest." Since there seems to be little question that
education is a protected interest, and since Rodriguez did not purport to disturb
the due process cases, this aspect of school reform litigation remains unchanged
by that decision. Indeed, the one known attempt to inject Rodriguez into this
area was promptly rejected. 90
III
AN OVERVIEW: THE LIMITS OF RODRIGUEZ

Although the initial reaction of many educational reform attorneys to
Rodriguez was despair, closer analysis and reflection should lead to a more sanguine attitude. While the holding that education is not a fundamental interest
has dashed the hopes of many, it must be remembered that these were only
inchoate hopes. Very few prior decisions were directly based on the fundamental nature of education." Indeed, virtually all of the opinions discussed in the previous section arrived at their conclusions without first finding
education to be a fundamental interest.
Is the compelling state interest test dead in the context of educational classification? The answer must be a resounding "no!" As a practical matter most
vulnerable classifications discriminate against either a racial or linguistic minority, and such classifications are still very much suspect. It is possible, of
course, to distinguish de jure and de facto racial classifications. 92 It seems to
this observer, however, that the de jure-de facto distinction, if it is to be given
validity, cannot be used to determine if the defendants have met their burden.
Any other interpretation would emasculate the whole concept of equal protection.
v. Page, 309 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
8
See, e.g., Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972); Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D.
Ohio 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354
F. Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973); Graham v. Knutzen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); Givens v.
Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972);
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd in part,
475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich.
1969).
Il Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
90 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3458
(U.S.91 Feb. 19, 1974).
Although many courts have prefaced their holding of equal protection violation by statements
of the importance of education, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Ordway
v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971), only a very few have predicated equal protection
violations on a finding of fundamentality. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).
'2 Compare Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), in which the court apparently
felt no need to make the distinction, with Lau v. Nichols, 472 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1973), which did
draw the distinction.

578

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

It seems likely that classification on the basis of wealth can still invoke strict
review in a school setting. The analysis of Rodriguez above suggests that it was
the uncertainty of the class discriminated against, combined with the mere
relative deprivation, that destroyed the claim for strict review. The obvious
lesson is that classifications chosen for future litigation should more clearly
be based on a lack of wealth, while deprivation in such cases should be more
analogous to that in Griffin and Douglas. The Rodriguez opinion indicates that
such classifications should involve deprivation which is absolute, and for which
there is no reasonable substitute.
It is also possible that "new" suspect classes will develop. One court has
already indicated that handicapped children comprise a suspect classification. 93
It can be persuasively argued that this group is "saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment ... as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. '9 4
Even with regard to education, Rodiguez does not preclude a finding that
a fundamental interest is involved under a state constitution's equal protection
clause. Some state constitutions also have specific references to education
that may have a bearing on educational classification issues. 95 In fact, several
state courts have insulated school finance decisions from Rodriguez by relying
on state provisions. 96
Where the rationally-related test is nevertheless determinative, it is still
possible to argue that there is a greater than usual burden on the governmental
entity when important, as opposed to fundamental, interests are involved. As
noted above, a number of decisions prior to Rodiguez nominally struck down
classifications under the passive review test even though the state in each case
had advanced rational reasons for the classification, 97 leading some commentators to suggest that the Court was taking into account the importance of the
interest involved. 98 Although Justice Powell in his majority opinion in Rodriguez
denied such a retreat from the double standard of equal protection, Justice
Marshall argued very persuasively for its demise, a view which may ultimately
prevail.
Finally, there is the possibility of relying on federal civil rights legislation
to attack school classifications even if equal protection theories are unavailable. 99 In short, the effect of Rodriguez on education reform legislation is
13 Colorado Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Colorado, CA No. C 4620 (D. Colo., July
13,
1973). But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
"'San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. See also McClung,
School Classification:Some Legal Approaches to Labels, 14 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 17, 28 n.91 (1973).
11 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2 (1889):

It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all
children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race,
color, caste, or sex.... The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of
public schools.
96 Thompson v. Engelking, Civil No. 47055 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Nov. 16, 1973); Robinson v.
Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 309 A.2d 65, modifying 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). See also Tractenberg,
Robinson v. Cahill: The "Thorough and Efficient" Clause, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 312 (1974).
97
See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9 See Gunther, supra note 13, at 34.
An example of this approach is found in the reliance by the plaintiffs in Lau v. Nichols,
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likely to be considerably less significant than was originally feared.
IV
THE EFFECT oF RODRIGUEZ ON SPECIFIC

AREAS OF LITIGATION

A. Tracking and Testing
To date, most attacks on tracking and testing have centered on the devices
used to track children, rather than on the concept of tracking itself.100 Where
a court has found evidence of a disproportionate number of minorities in
low tracks or testing which contains linguistic or cultural bias, it has shifted
the burden ofjustifying the tracking device to the school district. It is uncertain
whether the school districts have been held to the stricter standard of review,
but Rodriguez would not jeopardize this litigation in any event since the more
stringent standard is always triggered by a racial classification.
Hobson v. Hansen, as discussed above,' 0 ' struck down a tracking system because it segregated students into groups by tests that failed to achieve their
stated purpose of classifying students according to their abilities to learn, and
resulted in disproportionate numbers of poor and black students being placed
into the lower classes.' 2 Such a finding probably could be made as to virtually
all systems which employ a form of tracking. That conclusion would be easier
under the compelling interest test, but it is not precluded even under the passive
review of the rational relation test. 0 3
In addition, at least one commentator has suggested that a broadscale attack on tracking per se is possible under the education provisions of some
state constitutions.' 0 4 Many state constitutions describe the goals of education
in terms of egalitarianism and socialization.' 0 5 If tracking produces results
which are inconsistent with these goals and is of dubious educational value
otherwise, the whole concept may fall for lack of rationality.
B. Rights of Handicapped Children
Neither of the two major aspects of litigation on behalf of handicapped
children-procedural due process prior to placement into special classes for
the handicapped or total exclusion from the public school system' 06-appears
414 U.S. 563 (1974), on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in their pursuit of a bilingual judgment.

100See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp.
1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also the text at pp. 569-70 supra.
101See the text at pp. 569-70 supra.
102 269 F. Supp. at 513-14..

103 There is also possible analogy to the "right to treatment" cases. See Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). But see Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health,
349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972). In these cases the courts have held that the denial of procedural
safeguards to one civilly committed can only be justified if the promised benefits are forthcoming. In the event that they are not, then the whole rationale breaks down, and a violation of
either equal protection or substantive due process occurs.
104McClung, supra note 94, at 30-31.
"0'See, e.g., MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § II.
106 For both of these aspects, see Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972);
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to be threatened by Rodriguez. As noted above, Rodriguez involves no incursion
into due process rights.' 0 7 In addition, the Rodriguez opinion suggests that
absolute exclusion from the school system would lead to a different result than
does the relative deprivation of educational resources. The Court indicated
both that "some identifiable quantum of education" might be constitutionally
protected, 10 8 and that an absolute deprivation of education would present
a "far more compelling set of circumstances than the case before us today. '' °0
In reality, no rational-much less a compelling-reason can be advanced for
the exclusion of handicapped children, no matter how severe the handicap."t 0
Even the handicapped children cases which had advanced past due process
and exclusion issues to examine whether particular programs met a constitutional test of adequacy are not likely to be limited by Rodriguez. The placement of children in special education programs is so slipshod, the dumping
of children of disparate needs into a common class so usual, the use of the
outdated facilities so common, and the lack of urgently needed support services so complete that most children are little better off in a special education
setting than they would be if they were excluded from the educational system
entirely."' Given this state of affairs, it is no exaggeration to say that these children are "constructively excluded" from any education. It must be emphasized
that it is not relative adequacy that is being challenged, as was done in Rodriguez,
but actual inadequacy. Thus the exclusion precedents would still seem to
control. "12
C. Sex-related Classifications
As virtually all of the invalidated sex-related classifications have fallen
because the governmental entity could not meet even the test of rational relationship, these decisions seem undisturbed by Rodriguez. Moreover, this
area is a likely one for application of Justice Marshall's sliding scale concept if
it becomes the majority view. One of the leading cases cited for the proposition
that the Court looks askance at certain classifications, without classifying them
as suspect, is Reed v. Reed," 3 a sex discrimination case.
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
107See Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W.
3458 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
108411 U.S. at36.
0 9

1

Id. at 25 n.60.

110See the convincing and unrebutted testimony in PARC. 343 F. Supp. at 279.
"I See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON & D. BRADDOCK, supra note 42.
112 Many states also have laws and regulations prescribing appropriate education for handicapped
children under which substantive challenges can be made. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-24-1
(1956). The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1970), which provides
federal aid to states for the improvement of the education of handicapped children, could also
serve as the basis for obtaining improved educational opportunities. The money must be used
to establish programs of "sufficient size, scope, and quantity... as to give reasonable promise
of substantial progress toward meeting [the special needs of handicapped children]." Id. § 1413.
If the money is not being used to meet those special needs, suit could be brought for forfeiture
of the funds.
13404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), where a
plurality of the Court found sex to be a suspect classification.
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Where discrimination against married and pregnant students is involved,
it may still be possible to find a fundamental interest, since various cases have
1 4
indicated that the right of procreation is a fundamental interest. It is certainly
arguable that this interest is infringed by such sex discrimination, though one
case decided since Rodriguez, Houston v. PI'rosser,"15 is contrary authority. In
that case, a district court permitted a school district to transfer an unmarried
mother to night school, denying her the right to remain in a regular classroom. The court denied that the right of procreation was infringed by this
policy and found that the district's policy of segregation was rational since
"t]here is no dispute that students who marry 6or who become parents are
normally more precocious than other students.""1
Furthermore, in view of the regulations very recently proposed pursuant to the statute prohibiting sex discrimination on the part of educational
systems receiving federal funds,' 1 7 it may no longer be so important to rely
upon constitutional concepts of equal protection.
D. Fees
The most significant aspect of Rodriguez for the school fees cases is the
majority's rejection of the wealth classification argument because no distinct
group of persons could be singled out as discriminated against and because the
discrimination was deemed to be relative rather than absolute. In future fee
cases, these factors must be distinguished. Again, the models for a successful
9
8
attack on school fees must be Griffin v. Illinois' and Douglas v. California.?
Unlike some of the other areas of litigation discussed above, the fees cases
have, in the past, often depended on application of the stricter standard of
review. Hence, post-Rodriguez fee litigation, if it is to be successful, must depend either on such traditional models or on the development of new doctrines,
standard by the linking of wealth classuch as the implication of the stricter
20
sification with an important interest.1
CONCLUSION

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez was certainly not a victory
for those who would seek to reform the schools through litigation. Yet on
closer inspection the Rodriguez holdings are less than devastating, leaving whole
areas of prior litigation unaffected. Even where Rodriguez would seem to undercut prior victories, alternative theories remain available to support the results.
Perhaps the indirect psychological impact of the decision-permitting hostile
21
turn out to be the
courts to reject discriminatory classification claims -will
case's most significant aspect for other school reform litigation.
114 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See
also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 34 n.76.
"'361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
1 Id. at 298.
117 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970); 39 Fed. Reg. 22,229 (1974).
118351 U.S. 12 (1956).
119372 U.S. 353 (1963).
120 See, e.g., McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
121 Cf. Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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